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Over the past several years, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has 
begun shifting away from a “one-size-fits-all” approach to security and toward one 
predicated upon risk-based security principles. The TSA has also been called upon by the 
Government Accountability Office and U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of 
Inspector General to make risk-based decisions regarding the allocation and deployment 
of its resources. 
This thesis established an initial strategic framework with which to evaluate 
possible options and applied this framework to explore three possible paths forward. The 
first path was maintaining the current approach to resource deployments. The second path 
was the collection and analysis of various data points in order to understand the risk 
environment. The third path was the use of Bayesian game-theory to model adversarial 
actions.  
With the framework applied, the use of Bayesian game-theory was identified as 
the most beneficial to TSA in comparison to the other two assessed options. Strategic 
recommendations are also provided based upon research into the experiences of other 
entities with risk-based deployment methodologies.  
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Over the past several years, the U.S. Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) has begun shifting away from a “one-size-fit-all” approach to security and towards 
risk-based security principles “based on the understanding that the vast majority of 
people traveling pose little to no threat to aviation.”1  
The TSA has the opportunity to continue this evolution, and address calls from 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) to make risk-based decisions 
regarding the allocation and deployment of its resources, by investing in the development 
and refinement of a more tactical-level risk-based deployment methodology. Such a 
methodology can be thought of as an attempt to ensure that the right resources are at the 
right location at the right time to buy-down the greatest amount of risk. 
This thesis first proposes a framework for evaluating the use of various risk-based 
methodologies in the aviation security domain. The primary criteria of this framework are 
overall impacts to security effectiveness and system efficiency, as a successful risk-based 
deployment methodology should lead to an increase in both. The secondary criterions of 
this framework are compliance with the U.S. Constitution, likelihood of societal 
acceptance, and general political feasibility.  
With a framework established, three possible paths forward were proposed and 
assessed to determine which would yield the greatest likelihood of a positive outcome. 
The first path is maintaining the current approach towards resource deployment. At 
present, TSA as an enterprise lacks a standardized tactical-level risk-based deployment 
methodology for its assets and tends to instead rely upon a combination of individual 
subject matter expertise and the occasional program-specific approach. The second path 
is the adoption of a data-driven approach, similar to the use of existing tools, such as 
                                                 
1 “Risk-based Security: What This Means for You.” August 7, 2014, http://www.tsa.gov/pressroom-
channel/risk-based-security-what-means-you. 
 xvi 
PredPol and risk terrain modeling by law enforcement agencies. The third path is the 
adoption of a methodology based in Bayesian game theory.  
Using the framework, the use of Bayesian game theory was identified as the most 
advantageous to TSA in comparison to the other two assessed options. Among the 
benefits of this approach is that it is one with which the agency already possesses some 
knowledge of through its development of two such models, intelligent randomization in 
scheduling (IRIS) and game-theoretic unpredictable and randomly deployed security 
(GUARDS). This thesis also offers several strategic recommendations based upon 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is charged with “protect[ing] 
the Nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and 
commerce.”1 In the realm of aviation security, which will serve as the primary focus of 
this thesis, “Transportation Security Officers [TSOs] screened approximately 650 million 
passengers and more than two billion carry-on and checked bags, preventing 
approximately 105,000 dangerous prohibited items, including 2,300 firearms, from being 
carried onto planes” in Fiscal Year 2014 (FY14) alone.2  
A. BACKGROUND 
To execute its mission, TSA employs nearly 50,000 TSOs, 700 aviation 
transportation security inspectors, 800 canine teams, 700 advanced imaging technology 
(AIT) machines, and many other resources to include a classified number of Federal Air 
Marshals (FAMS).3 By simply examining the number of passengers that each canine 
team would need to screen each year for 100% coverage, for example, the complexity of 
executing TSA’s expansive mission with its relatively limited resources quickly becomes 
apparent.  
It is important to note that the challenge of optimizing resource deployment is 
certainly not unique to TSA, as agencies in both the public and private sectors commonly 
struggle with similar circumstances. However, many of these same entities have 
successfully developed and implemented frameworks and methodologies designed to 
help support important decisions, such as where to deploy resources to realize the greatest 
returns.  
                                                 
1 “Mission,” July 23, 2014, http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/mission.  
2 U.S. Transportation Security Administration, Transportation Security: Are Our Airports Safe? 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Transportation Security Administration, 2015), http://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/ 
files/assets/pdf/tsa_testimony5-13-15.pdf. 
3 U.S. Transportation Security Administration, TSA by the Numbers (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Transportation Security Administration, 2015), http://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/pdf/ 
tsabythenumbers_final.pdf. 
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B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Over the past several years, TSA has been shifting away from a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach to security and towards risk-based security principles “based on the 
understanding that the vast majority of people traveling pose little to no threat to 
aviation.”4 While this approach has certainly had an impact on the interactions between 
the traveling public and the agency, it has also spurred changes within the agency itself 
including continued refinements in the strategic risk-based allocation of its resources at 
the operational (i.e., national) level. 
TSA has the opportunity to continue this evolution, and address calls from the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) to make risk-based decisions 
regarding the allocation and deployment of its resources, by investing in the development 
and refinement of a more tactical-level risk-based deployment methodology. Such a 
methodology can be thought of as an attempt to ensure that the right resources are at the 
right location at the right time to buy-down the greatest amount of risk. 
Through the following research, the author hopes to begin to identify and address 
some of the questions that TSA would need to consider should the determination be made 
to pursue such a methodology actively. How is “risk” defined? How will “effectiveness” 
and “efficiency” be measured? Have other organizations undertaken similar projects, and 
if so, what was the outcome? Are there legal concerns? Are there public policy concerns? 
How will the methodology accommodate new information?  
Lastly, the author presents three possible paths forward with the goal of 
demonstrating the viability, or lack thereof, of a tactical-level risk-based deployment 
methodology.  
 
                                                 
4 “Risk-Based Security: What This Means for You,” August 7, 2014, http://www.tsa.gov/pressroom-
channel/risk-based-security-what-means-you.  
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis attempts to answer the following research questions.  
1. Primary Research Question 
How can TSA use a risk-based deployment methodology to deploy its resources 
in an effort to increase security effectiveness and system efficiency? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• How could risk be defined and how could it be measured? 
• How could security effectiveness be defined and how could it measured? 
• How could system efficiency be defined and how could it measured? 
• Do any risk-based deployment models currently exist that could be 
studied? 
• What legal, social, and political concerns might inhibit the adoption of a 
different model for resource deployment in the aviation security domain? 
D. ARGUMENT 
The primary argument for adopting a tactical-level risk-based deployment 
methodology is quite simple, why would an entity not use readily available information, 
or that could be easily collected to optimize the deployment of its limited resources?  
When exploring companies in the private sector, for example, those that are 
successful understand the importance of being at the right place at the right time, which is 
why retailers work hard to be located near and available for their target demographic. 
While unique challenges certainly arise that come along with operating in the public 
sector versus private industry, they can be (and oftentimes are) overcome. A prime 
example is the ability for a private company to hire, transfer, and occasionally, lay off, 
individuals at-will in response to the ebbs and flows of the business world. TSA has a 
similar ability to shift resources through programs, such as the National Deployment 
 4 
Force, which is designed in part to surge “personnel in support of screening requirements 
that exceed airport staffing levels.”5 
The second argument for adopting an enterprise approach towards tactical-level 
risk-based deployment methodology is that the information that serves as the 
underpinning can be shared with others, both within and outside of TSA, to enhance 
everyone’s understanding of the risk environment. As a recent study on the sharing of 
spatial information (e.g., home addresses) amongst sub-national government entities 
noted, the data that emergency responders need to make informed decisions rarely exists 
in a single place.6 While certainly considered to be problematic, it is also an issue that 
can be overcome through something as simple as a data-sharing initiative. That said, it is 
important for willing entities to recognize and overcome the “organisational/institutional 
issues, technical and technological issues, economic factors, legal considerations and 
political issues” that oftentimes complicate the sharing of information.7  
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
TSA will likely continue to face a paradoxical scrutiny of its operations, to 
include the allocation of personnel and equipment, in the absence of a significant incident 
that simultaneously validates the need for security the agency provides while calling into 
question the effectiveness of its current approach. In other words, a possibility exists that 
the agency will face budget cuts moving into the future until such a time that the cuts 
directly jeopardize its ability to execute its mission successfully. With this understanding, 
and the shift towards risk-based security already underway, TSA can benefit from the 
adoption a methodology that will facilitate the effective and efficient deployment of its 
increasingly limited resources. 
                                                 
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, TSA’s National Deployment 
Force–FY 2012 Follow-Up (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector 
General, 2012), 201, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-14_Dec12.pdf. 
6 Kevin McDougall, “A Local-State Government Spatial Data Sharing Partnership Model to Facilitate 




At present, research exists regarding the use of risk-based deployment 
methodologies in fields ranging from private sector retail outlet site selection to law 
enforcement activities in major cities. However, little research exists regarding their 
application in the aviation security domain and this thesis seeks to begin the process of 
filling this gap and initiate further academic discussion on the topic.  
Lastly, effectiveness and efficiency are oft-cited nebulous terms whose meaning 
is generally implicitly understood while simultaneously difficult to define in absolute 
terms. For example, during the 113th Congress, the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs previously established the Subcommittee on the 
Efficiency and Effectiveness of Federal Programs and the Federal Workforce. This 
subcommittee was charged with “oversee[ing] the management, efficiency, effectiveness, 
and economy of all agencies and departments in the federal government” without ever 
truly defining how these principles could be applied across a diverse landscape like the 
entirety of the federal bureaucracy.8  
Understanding that effectiveness and efficiency are two very important principles, 
particularly within the federal government, this thesis seeks to establish a working 
framework that will allow readers to understand their meaning with regards to the 
deployment of aviation security assets and make informed decisions.  
F. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
Like most entities, both public and private, TSA faces the challenge of 
determining how to best invest constrained resources to accomplish its overarching 
mission, which in the case of TSA, is “protect[ing] the Nation’s transportation systems to 
ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.”9 While this mission, not unlike 
those of most organizations, is fairly straightforward, the complexity quickly comes into 
focus when the size of this nation’s transportation systems relative to number of assets 
available to help protect it is considered.  
                                                 
8 “About Efficiency and Effectiveness of Federal Programs and the Federal Workforce,” accessed July 
29, 2015, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/fpfw/about.  
9 “Mission.” 
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In such an environment, any opportunity to increase the effectiveness and 
efficiency of deployed resources sounds ideal; however, careful deliberation must be 
given to the facts and circumstances surrounding each of the options presented to help 
ensure a positive outcome. Given that little scientific research exists on the use of risk-
based deployment methodologies in the aviation security domain relative to other 
domains, such as law enforcement, a policy options analysis allows for the exploration 
and assessment of opportunities in this emerging field. 
G. EVALUATIVE CRITERIA 
To assess each of the policy options equally, the following criteria have been 
established as a baseline for comparison.  
1. Security Effectiveness 
As a measureable increase in security effectiveness is the first output of the 
primary research question, a working definition must be established. For the purposes of 
this research, this definition draws upon the mission of TSA and is understood as the 
likelihood of a provided policy to holistically protect a provided transportation system.  
While this definition could certainly be considered overly broad, it is also scalable 
and makes it possible to explore a transportation system at a relatively micro-level (e.g., 
airports) or macro-level (e.g., aviation systems). Additionally, this definition allows for 
the entirety of a given ecosystem, such as the public and sterile (to include aircraft) areas 
of an airport, to be considered. This concept is particularly important, as it is highly 
unlikely that any given system will always have sufficient resources to carry out its 
mission. As such, the deployment of resources to one particular area will likely deprive 
another of their protective capabilities, if not at least temporarily.  
2. System Efficiency 
Increased system efficiency is the second expected output of a successful risk-
based deployment methodology. For the purposes of this research, system efficiency will 
be understood as “maintaining federal government services or outcomes using fewer 
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resources (such as time and money) or improving or increasing the quality or quantity of 
services or outcomes while maintaining (or reducing) resources.”10 
This definition is borrowed from a 2011 GAO report titled Streamlining 
Government—Key Practices from Select Efficiency Initiatives Should Be Shared 
Governmentwide. The benefit of using this definition is that it has been previously cited 
by the U.S. government’s primary audit agency in its own independent study on the topic, 
thereby lending credibility in the event of scrutiny. 
3. Risk Mitigation 
While increasing security effectiveness and system efficiency should be the 
primary objectives of a risk-based deployment methodology, their execution must be 
carefully balanced with many other factors. Among these considerations are compliance 
with the U.S. Constitution, likelihood of social acceptance, and general political 
feasibility. 
a. Constitutional Considerations 
The U.S. Constitution is the primary cornerstone for laws the United States and 
compliance with the principles it establishes is non-negotiable. While all laws are based, 
in some form or fashion, in the U.S. Constitution, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are 
of particular importance with regards to a risk-based deployment methodology. As such, 
the following questions are considered for the purposes of this research: 
• Does the proposed option violate “the right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures,” as established in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution?11 
                                                 
10 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Streamlining Government—Key Practices from Select 
Efficiency Initiatives Should Be Shared Governmentwide (GAO-11-908) (Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office, 2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585552.pdf. 
11 “The Constitution of the United States, Amendment IV,” accessed June 6, 2015, http://www. 
archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html.  
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• Does the proposed option deprive individuals of “life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law,” as established in the Fifth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution?12 
b. Social Acceptance 
With nearly two million encounters with the traveling public each and every day 
in the aviation domain alone, it is vitally important TSA adopt a strategy that considers 
the opinions of those its serves and protects.13 It is particularly important when stopping 
to consider recent polling that indicates nearly half (46%) of respondents felt TSA was 
doing an “only fair” or “poor” job compared to a rating of “pretty good” or “excellent.”14  
• What is the anticipated impact to travel time? Will the option reduce 
overall travel time or increase it? 
• What is the anticipated impact to individual screening scrutiny? Will the 
option reduce screening scrutiny or increase it? 
• If information regarding individual travel will be used, how will it be used 
and how will it be protected? 
4. Political Feasibility 
Like many federal agencies, TSA relies heavily upon funding allocated by the 
U.S. Congress and approved by the President. As such, it is important to consider the 
likely questions from these important stakeholders.  
• Is the option in-line with the established mission of the agency? 
• What is the anticipated impact to allocated resources? Can the current 
resources allocated be reduced or will additional resources be required? 
                                                 
12 “The Constitution of the United States, Amendment V,” accessed June 6, 2015, http://www. 
archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html.  
13 “TSA by the Numbers.” 
14 Larry Shannon-Missal, “Harris Interactive: Harris Polls > U.S. Mint & FAA Receive Highest 
Ratings of 17 Government Agencies; FBI, CDC, NIH, CIA and Office of the Surgeon General Also Well 
Regarded,” The Harris Poll, February 26, 2015, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/ 
tabid/447/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/mid/1508/ArticleId/1557/Default.aspx. 
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II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
It is important to note that the underlying concept of using information to ensure 
that an organization has the right people at the right place at the right time, or for the 
purposes of thesis called a resource deployment methodology, is certainly not novel. The 
necessity of information has long been recognized as a key ingredient to strategic 
decision making, particularly in the field of security. As the fabled Chinese military 
strategist Sun Tzu noted in his 6th century BC work, The Art of War, “if you know your 
enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles.”15  
This section provides a brief overview of risk-based methodologies within TSA, 
business, and law enforcement.  
A. RISK-BASED DEPLOYMENT METHODOLOGIES IN TSA 
Historically, TSA has been a “risk-based” organization since its inception in many 
ways, although not always in a traditional “adversarial” sense of the word. For example, 
when it was first established, one of the primary “risks” that it needed to address was not 
having enough staffing to execute its mission in the first place. In an effort to mitigate 
this risk, TSA hired and deployed more than 55,000 individuals in its first year of 
existence.16  
In the years that followed, TSA began to recognize certain locations were 
overstaffed while others were understaffed and initiated a study to mitigate this risk and 
right-size its workforce in September 2003.17 This study continued into 2004, at which 
point, TSA was formally called upon by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
                                                 
15 Samuel B. Griffith, The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
16 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Testimony, Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate, Aviation Security—Improvement Still 
Needed in Federal Aviation Security Efforts (GAO-04-592T) (Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office, 2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04592t.pdf. 
17 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to the Ranking Democratic Member, Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives More Clarity on the Authority of Federal 
Security Directors Is Needed (GAO-05-935) (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2005), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/247917.pdf. 
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Prevention Act (IRPTA) of 2004 to develop a set of staffing allocation standards that 
would provide “the necessary levels of aviation security” while minimizing the “average 
aviation security related delay experienced by passengers.”18  
In 2005, TSA presented a more standardized staffing allocation model to the U.S. 
Congress in accordance with the IRTPA and received generally positive feedback in a 
subsequent GAO audit.19 While the GAO did note that TSA’s use of the model had 
“helped guide its allocation of resources,” it also found that its use still resulted in some 
airports having too many screeners while others were left having too few and 
recommended periodic reevaluations of the model’s underlying assumptions and 
factors.20  
In the years that have followed, TSA has continued to hone its approach with a 
notable shift being its adoption of the screening procedures now commonly thought of 
when the term “risk-based security” is used. This passenger screening approach, covered 
more extensively by Kenneth Fletcher, Center for Homeland Defense and Security 
(CHDS) MASTER’S PROGRAM alum, in his thesis is designed to “calibrate security 
measures to groups of individuals based on risk.”21  
The GAO and the DHS OIG have also pressed for TSA to continue to evolve over 
the past several years, with both releasing reports noting the need for TSA to develop 
risk-based deployment methodologies for several of its deployable assets.  
• Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs)—A recent GAO report noted the 
need to “conduct a comprehensive risk assessment to include threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence of airports nationwide to determine the 
effective deployment of [Screening of Passengers by Observation 
                                                 
18 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees, Aviation Security: 
TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should 




21 Kenneth C. Fletcher, “Aviation Security: A Case for Risk-Based Passenger Screening” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/10601/11Dec 
%255FFletcher.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y. 
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Techniques] (SPOT) if TSA’s ongoing Aviation Modal Risk Assessment 
lacks this information.”22 
• Passenger Screening Canines (PSCs)—A recent GAO report noted “that 
PSC teams have not been deployed to the highest-risk airport terminals 
and concourses based on TSA’s high-risk list.”23  
• Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Teams—A recent 
DHS-OIG report noted the need to “provide enhanced guidance regarding 
risk-based planning and increase access to risk assessment information 
that VIPR teams can use to prioritize deployments with partners and 
stakeholders”24 
It is important to note that TSA has already begun to address many of these 
recommendations. For example, BDOs were historically allocated based solely upon 
information from the civil aviation threat assessment (CATA) at the time the GAO report 
was released.25 Today, the annual allocation of all threat assessment division assets, 
including PSCs and BDOs, across the United States is now conducted through risk-based 
allocation models that utilize a variety of data points to identify which locations should 
receive these specialized assets and how many they should receive.26  
                                                 
22 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, Aviation Security, Efforts to Validate TSA’s 
Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen 
Validation and Address Operational Challenges (GAO-10-763) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2010). 
23 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, TSA Explosives 
Detection Canine Program—Actions Needed to Analyze Data and Ensure Canine Teams are Effectively 
Utilized (GAO-13-239) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013). 
24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Efficiency and Effectiveness of 
TSA's Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Program Within Rail and Mass Transit Systems 
(Redacted) (OIG-12-103) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012).  
25 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, Aviation Security, Efforts to Validate TSA’s 
Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen 
Validation and Address Operational Challenges. 
26 Utilizing Canine Teams to Detect Explosives and Mitigate Threats: Hearing Before the Committee 
on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, United States House of Representatives, 
113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Melanie Harvey, Division Director, TSA TAD); TSA's SPOT Program 
and Initial Lessons From the LAX Shooting: Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security, 
Subcommittee on Transportation Security, United States House of Representatives, 113th Cong. (2014) 
(statement of John Pistole, Administrator, TSA). 
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B. RISK-BASED DEPLOYMENT METHODOLOGIES IN BUSINESS 
For a broad application of the concept of using models to inform “risk-based” 
decisions about where to place resources, in many towns across the United States, look 
not much further than down the street and find the nearest Starbucks. Since 1971, 
Starbucks has grown from a single retail outlet in Seattle, Washington, into the largest 
coffeehouse company in the world with over 20,000 stores in 64 countries.27 The 
company has also been tremendously profitable and the price of Starbucks stock has risen 
from $0.76/share to over $77/share since it was first offered in 1992.28 Despite this 
success, the company has certainly faced its share of challenges along the way.  
In 2008, the former chief executive officer of Starbucks, Harry Schultz, came out 
of retirement to close hundreds of locations, many of which had only recently opened, 
following a period of rapid growth and declining sales. During a biennial investors’ 
conference in December 2012, Schultz noted, “In 2007 and 2008, the growth of 
Starbucks was undisciplined, and growth was more of a strategy as opposed to an 
outcome.”29 In an effort to instill discipline and better inform decisions regarding where 
to open new locations, Starbucks turned to geographic information systems (GIS) 
technology.30 
By working with Esri, a GIS provider with access to thousands of data points 
ranging from consumer voting preferences to the amount of money spent on recreation, 
Starbucks was able to identify prime locations with the greatest amount of market 
potential.31 During the same 2012 conference, Schultz went on to announce plans to open 
“at least 1,500 new stores over the next five years in the United States alone” and boasted 
that “as a result of the demography, the data, the science and the experience we have, that 
                                                 
27 Starbucks Corporation, “Q2–FY14 Earnings Release,” April 24, 2014, pp. 1–6. 
28 “SBUX Historical Prices,” accessed August 7, 2015, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=SBUX.  
29 Malcom Wheatley, “Data-Driven Location Choices Drive Latest Starbucks Surge,” January 10, 
2013, DataInformed, http://data-informed.com/data-driven-location-choices-drive-latest-starbucks-surge/. 
30 Ibid. 




these locations in the returns will mirror what we’ve been able to accomplish in 2011 and 
2012” which was a period of particularly high growth.32 This forecasted growth has thus 
far proven accurate with Starbucks revenue increasing nearly 45% from $13.3 billion 
2012 to $19.2 billion 2015.33 
C. RISK-BASED DEPLOYMENT METHODOLOGIES IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY 
The use of information and a structured methodology within law enforcement to 
understand crime and determine where to deploy resources can serve as a strong model 
for understanding potential applications at TSA given the similar, and oftentimes, 
overlapping, missions of law enforcement and homeland security.  
The first known application of using data to understand criminal activity occurred 
in 1829 when André-Michel Guerry and Adriano Balbi published a series of maps that 
identified where crimes occurred relative to school instruction.34 Guerry, along with 
fellow researcher Adolphe Quetelet, later went on to include other factors ranging from 
the prevalence of alcoholism to population diversity in an effort to understand better the 
role that sociological conditions play in criminal activity.35 This concept continued to 
evolve and soon made its way to the United States in the 1920s when Clifford Shaw and 
Henry McKay, both University of Chicago professors, began using maps to understand 
juvenile delinquency better in Chicago, IL.36 
In the 1960s, the availability of computers led to several advances not only in the 
field of crime mapping but also resource allocation. For example, by using programs, 
such as SYMAP, designed by Harvard University, the St. Louis Police Department was 
                                                 
32 Wheatley, “Data-Driven Location Choices Drive Latest Starbucks Surge.” 
33 “SBUX Income Statement.” 
34 Michael Friendly and Nicolas de Sainte Agathe, “André-Michel Guerry’s Ordonnateur Statistique: 
The First Statistical Calculator?,” The American Statistician 66, no. 3 (August 1, 2012): 195–200, doi:10. 
1080/00031305.2012.714716. 
35 Luc Anselin et al., “Spatial Analyses of Crime,” Criminal Justice 2000 4 (2000), http://www. 
ncjrs.org/criminal_justice2000/vol_4/04e.pdf.  
36 Keith Harries, Mapping Crime: Principle and Practice (Washington, DC: National Institute of 
Justice, 1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/nij/mapping/front.html. 
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able to establish the Resource Allocation Research Unit with the goal of using “this new 
technical capability in the area of resource allocation.”37 This trend continued into the 
1980s and 1990s as computers became increasingly more commonplace.38 Today, police 
departments in several major cities including Los Angeles, Atlanta, Seattle, and New 
York City use crime-mapping and other techniques to determine where to deploy their 
officers.39 
                                                 
37 Glenn A. Pauly, J. Thomas McEwen, and Stephen J. Finch, Computer Mapping—A New Technique 
in Crime Analysis (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration, 1967), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/199NCJRS.pdf. 
38 Harries, Mapping Crime: Principle and Practice. 




III. RISK-BASED DEPLOYMENT MODELS CURRENTLY IN-
USE IN SECURITY SETTINGS 
A number of different resource deployment approaches are in use throughout the 
world of law enforcement, ranging from the unstructured (e.g., pure gut-instinct) to the 
highly structured (e.g., SYMAP). A selection of some of the more structured approaches 
that have demonstrated positive results and could serve as models going forward is 
provided in the following sections. 
A. CURRENT DATA-DRIVEN RISK-BASED DEPLOYMENT MODELS 
For the purposes of this research, data-driven approaches to crime and traffic 
safety (DDACTS), risk terrain modeling (RTM), and PredPol are explored as they are 
designed to provide information at a tactical-level.  
1. DDACTS 
DDACTS is a joint initiative between the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the National Institute of Justice 
designed to “reduce the incidence of crime, crashes, and traffic violations across the 
country.”40 As summarized in an article appearing in the CALEA Update, “the basic 
premise of DDACTS is that the use of highly visible traffic enforcement in areas that 
have been shown to experience high levels of both crime and traffic problems is an 
efficient and effective way to improve the safety of the public.”41 
While the nexus between DDACTS and data-driven risk-based deployment 
models may at first glance appear non-existent, it is DDACTS “strategic and tactical 
focus on places” that makes it an interesting model for comparison.42 DDACTS is based 
                                                 
40 “Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety,” accessed July 22, 2015, http://www.nhtsa. 
gov/ddacts.  
41 Howard B. Hall, “Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safet—Its Application to Public 
Safety and Accreditation,” CALEA Update, no. 103, 2010, http://www.calea.org/calea-update-magazine/ 
issue-103/data-driven-approaches-crime-and-traffic-safety-its-application-publ. 
42 Alexander Weiss, Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety (DDACTS)—An Historical 
Overview (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Safety Administration, 
2013), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/809689.pdf. 
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upon the assumptions that “it is more efficient to focus on places than to focus on 
individuals” and “tools like computer mapping have made it easier to adopt place-based 
strategies.”43 Furthermore, this approach has thus far proven successful in the field. For 
example, an evaluation of crime rates before and after DDACTS was implemented in 
Baltimore County, MD, found “robberies had decreased by 33.5 percent, burglaries by 
16.6 percent, and auto thefts by 40.9 percent.”44 
The Nashville Police Department also experienced success through the use of 
DDACTS after it was deployed in January 2004 following a spike in drunk driving 
accidents.45 Between 2003 and 2009, the department saw the number of fatal vehicle 
accidents decrease 15.6 percent, accidents resulting in injuries decrease 30.8 percent, and 
arrests for driving under the influence (DUI) increase 72.3 percent.46 Additionally, an 
“analysis of the [Federal Bureau of Investigation] FBI [Uniform Crime Reporting] UCR 
data for the Nashville metropolitan area also revealed that the rate of Part 1 crimes 
committed between 2003 and 2008 decreased by 13.9 percent,” which demonstrates the 
potential of power of data-driven deployment decisions.47 
DDACTS is currently deployed in several municipalities throughout the United 
States, including Baltimore County, Maryland Police Department; Lafourche Parish, 
Louisiana Sheriff’s Office; Nashville, Tennessee Police Department; Oakland, California 
Police Department; Rochester, New York Police Department; St Albans Police 
Department and Vermont State Police; and Washoe County, Nevada Police 
Department.48  
                                                 
43 Weiss, Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety (DDACTS)—An Historical Overview. 
44 Walter L. Perry et al., Predictive Policing: The Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement 





48 “Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety.” 
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2. RTM 
Similar to DDACTS, RTM is a data-driven risk-based deployment methodology 
that can be explored to gain a better understanding of the viability of concept. RTM is a 
conceptual methodology developed by Rutgers University professors Dr. Leslie Kennedy 
and Dr. Joel Caplan. The framework centers on the understanding that “risk is a 
continuous dynamic value that increases or decreases intensity and clusters or dissipates 
in different areas over time.”49 Dr. Kennedy and Dr. Caplan have also noted that “risk is 
determined by a nexus of certain factors and it changes only as the characteristics and 
interactions of those factors vary.”50 This working definition and understanding of risk is 
particularly relevant to a tactical-level risk-based deployment methodology ,which seeks 
to place resources in the most optimal locations at the most optimal times relative to 
assessed risk.  
With this understanding of risk, RTM uses GIS and applies layers of information 
to maps to identify potential risk hotspots and subsequently inform where police or other 
assets should be deployed.51 See Figure 1. This information can include historical 
criminal activity, demographic factors (e.g., where parolees live), environmental factors 
(e.g., vacant buildings), or any other factor that the users deem relevant to their 
analysis.52 
  
                                                 
49 Joel Caplan and Leslie Kennedy, Introduction to Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM) for Strategic 
Decision-Making and Tactical Action (Newark, NJ: Rutgers Center on Public Security, October 8, 2009), 
http://www.rutgerscps.org/docs/IntroToRTM_Brief.pdf. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Joel Caplan and Leslie Kennedy, Risk Terrain Modeling Compendium (Newark, NJ: Rutgers Center 




Figure 1.  Sample Risk Terrain Model Map  
 
Source: Charles Anyinam, “Using Risk Terrain Modeling Technique to Identify Places 
with the Greatest Risk for Violent Crime in New Haven,” Crime Mapping & Analysis 
News, Spring 2015, http://crimemapping.info/article/using-risk-terrain-modeling-techni 
que-identify-places-greatest-risk-violent-crimes-new-haven/. 
A major benefit of this approach is that police departments are able not only to 
identify risk hotspots by location but also identify the risk presented by these locations.53 
For example, RTM may indicate that a particular neighborhood in a city is not only a 
hotspot for criminal activity but that the commerce and usage of illegal narcotics poses 
the greatest challenge.54 This information allows police departments to deploy their 
                                                 
53 Jonas H. Baughman and Joel Caplan, “Applying Risk Terrain Modeling to a Violent Crimes 




limited resources strategically, in this case, narcotics officers to mitigate the greatest 
amount of risk.55 
Several police departments are currently utilizing RTM with demonstrated 
success. In 2010, the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department conducted an annual 
exercise called the Violent Crimes Initiative and noted their “activities were most 
effective at suppressing crime and preventing the emergence of new crimes when they 
simultaneously targeted crime (density) hotspots and the highest-risk places identified by 
the RTM.”56 
3. PredPol 
PredPol is another commercially available tool designed by a team of Ph.D. 
mathematicians and social scientists at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) 
and Santa Clara University in close collaboration with crime analysts and line level 
officers at both the Los Angeles and Santa Cruz Police departments.57 Similar to RTM, 
PredPol uses data regarding historical criminal activity to forecast future criminal activity 
but it does not include information regarding specific individuals or groups.58 This 
information is also graphically displayed using a GIS to help determine when and where 






                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Baughman and Caplan, “Applying Risk Terrain Modeling to a Violent Crimes Initiative in Kansas 
City, Missouri.” 
57 “About Us,” 2015, http://www.predpol.com/about/.  
58 Ibid. 
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Figure 2.  Sample PredPol Map 
 
 
Source: Michell Eloy, “APD Rolls Out Crime Predicting Program,” 90.1FM WABE—
Atlanta’s NPR Station, September 30, 2013, http://news.wabe.org/post/apd-rolls-out-
crime-predicting-program. 
Several police departments in the United States and abroad have begun using 
PredPol in recent years with positive results. In Los Angeles, CA, one of the first major 
U.S. police departments to adopt the system, the use of PredPol led to a 12% reduction in 
property crimes during a six-month period when compared to the previous year.59 Similar 
results were seen in neighboring Santa Cruz, CA, with a 19% reduction in burglaries in a 
six-month period with PredPol while other variables (e.g., shift length) were held 
constant.60  
Internationally, Kent Police began their journey into the world of risk-based 
deployment methodologies after officers first asked how their peers in the United States 
                                                 
59 “Don’t Even Think about It,” July 20, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21582042-it-
getting-easier-foresee-wrongdoing-and-spot-likely-wrongdoers-dont-even-think-about-it. 
60 Zach Friend, “Predictive Policing: Using Technology to Reduce Crime,” FBI, April 9, 2013, 
https://leb.fbi.gov/2013/april/predictive-policing-using-technology-to-reduce-crime. 
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were using technology for predictive policing efforts in 2012.61 Soon after, the 
department began working with PredPol and developed a plan to bring this approach to 
Kent that culminated with the launch of several pilots nearly one year later.62  
The initial findings of these pilots were positive, with one trial finding that street 
crime occurred in PredPol defined locations 8.5% of the time compared to the Kent 
Police Analysis department’s score of 5%.63 By the conclusion of the pilot, this number 
had increased to an average of 11% with a singular high reported at 19%, while a 4% 
overall reduction in crime was seen.64  
B. CURRENT BAYESIAN GAME THEORY RISK-BASED DEPLOYMENT 
MODELS 
Before transitioning into a discussion on intelligent randomization in scheduling 
(IRIS) and game-theoretic unpredictable and randomly deployed security (GUARDS), 
two models that show promise for helping TSA increase its security effectiveness and 
system efficiency, it is important to understand the basic premises of Bayesian game 
theory and its utility in risk-based resource deployment.  
1. Bayesian Game Theory 
Bayesian game theory is based upon Bayes’ rule, which essentially holds “by 
updating our initial belief about something with objective new information, we get a new 
and improved belief.”65 For example, if individuals went hiking in the woods with a 
belief that they had a 50% of encountering a bear, only to learn from a park ranger that a 
bear had not been spotted in the forest in which they were hiking in the past 100 years, 
                                                 
61 Ćemal Dolićanin et al., Handbook of Research on Democratic Strategies and Citizen-Centered E-
Government Services (Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2014).  
62 Kent Police, Corporate Services, Analysis Department, PredPol Operational Review—Initial 
Findings (Kent, UK: Kent Police, 2013), http://www.statewatch.org/docbin/uk-2013-11-kent-police-pp-
report.pdf. 
63 “Don’t Even Think about It.” 
64 Kent Police, Corporate Services, Analysis Department, PredPol Operational Review (Kent, UK: 
Kent Police, 2014), http://www.statewatch.org/docbin/uk-2014-kent-police-predpol-op-review.pdf. 
65 Sharon Bertsch McGrayne, The Theory That Would Not Die: How Bayes’ Rule Cracked the Enigma 
Code, Hunted Down Russian Submarines, & Emerged Triumphant from Two Centuries of Controversy 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011). 
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they would likely downgrade their initial belief to something much closer to 0%.66 Now, 
if the park ranger yelled to the hikers as they parted ways “Yeah, no bears have been 
‘spotted’ because no one is silly enough to hike in that bear-infested forest!” then the 
hikers would likely reconsider and increase their belief that they may encounter a bear.  
When Bayes’ rule is applied to a risk-based resource deployment model, it allows 
the methodology to account for changes in the risk environment with an understanding 
that risk is not a static value. Furthermore, Bayes’ rule is an important concept to 
combine with game theory, which seeks to analyze the interaction between agents in a 
situation in which a set of possible moves exists and each move has a set of possible 
outcomes.67  
For example, consider a simple scenario with the aforementioned hikers 
continuing their journey into the woods and entering a long, narrow cave in which they 
discover a bear attempting to exit. Keeping things relatively simple, both the hikers and 
bear each have three options: stand their ground, turn around and move away in the 
opposite direction, or continue moving forward. Each permutation of these options has a 
possible outcome, such as a violent interaction if both the hikers and bear decide to move 
forward, and game theory holds that both actors will weigh these outcomes based on their 
own objectives.  
If it is learned that the both the bear and the hikers decide to move forward in the 
narrow cave, a likelihood of the hikers surviving the ensuing encounter can be assigned 
based on the knowledge of previous bear and human interactions. However, if the hikers 
move forward only to discover that the bear is actually a newborn cub, Bayes’ rule makes 
it possible to change people’s understanding of the danger the situation presents yet 
again.  
The relevance of Bayesian game theory in aviation security, or any security 
domain, cannot be understated, as defenders (e.g., TSA) seldom possess all possible 
                                                 
66 B. John Garrick et al., “Confronting the Risks of Terrorism: Making the Right Decisions,” 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety 86, no. 2 (November 2004): 129–76.  
67 Shaun Hargreaves-Heap and Yanis Varoufakis, Game Theory: A Critical Introduction (London: 
Routledge, 2004). 
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information regarding the current risk environment with which to make resource 
deployment decisions. Despite this “fog of war,” both the defender and adversary tend to 
possess at least some cursory knowledge upon which their beliefs are predicated and 
upon which a Bayesian game theory model can be applied.  
2. Applications of Bayesian Game Theory in Homeland Security 
With an understanding of Bayesian game theory established, two existing models 
can be leveraged by TSA. The first, IRIS, was initially developed by the University of 
Southern California’s Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events 
(CREATE) for use by the FAMS in deploying officers aboard U.S. commercial flights 
shows and has demonstrated positive results in several evaluations.68  
In one such evaluation, regional deployment schedules were generated using three 
different approaches. The first approach incorporated a uniform random policy in which 
FAMS could be deployed to any flight irrespective to its assessed risk, while the second 
used a naïve weighting policy in which the likelihood of deployment was proportionate to 
assessed risk.69 When the results were compared to the schedules generated by IRIS, 
IRIS was shown to be “superior to the other two strategies in every region tested.”70 
Shortly after IRIS was introduced, GUARDS was developed by CREATE to aid 
with the deployment of TSA resources throughout airports across the nation.71 One 
unique aspect of GUARDS, as the name suggests, is that it was based upon an 
understanding that TSA does not have enough resources to provide 100% security and 
subsequently works to maximize the effectiveness of unpredictable scheduling in an 
                                                 
68 Jason Tsai et al., IRIS—A Tool for Strategic Security Allocation in Transportation Networks (Los 
Angeles: USC Vitberbi, Teamcore Research Group, University of Southern California, 2009), http://team 
core.usc.edu/papers/2009/aamas-09-industry.pdf.  
69 Tsai et al., IRIS—A Tool for Strategic Security Allocation in Transportation Networks. 
70 Ibid. 
71 James Pita et al., GUARDS—Innovative Application of Game Theory for National Airport Security 
(Los Angeles: USC Vitberbi, Teamcore Research Group, University of Southern California, 2011), http:// 
teamcore.usc.edu/papers/2011/GUARDS_Ind2.pdf.  
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effort to mitigate assessed risk.72 Much like IRIS, GUARDS has demonstrated positive 
results with regards to its impact on security effectiveness in trial evaluations.  
In one such evaluation, the impact of GUARDS deployments was compared 
against those of two other deployment strategies to determine which would provide the 
greatest mitigation against a notional adversarial attack. The first deployment strategy 
could be characterized as uniform, as all areas received equal treatment.73 The second 
deployment strategy deployed resources using the underlying GUARDS methodology; 
however, the adversary was not allowed to plan around security countermeasures (a point 
of distinction in Bayesian game theory).74 The results of these trials were then compared 
against those using GUARDS with the adversarial security circumvention constraint 
removed, with both GUARDS results outperforming the uniform approach.75 
Furthermore, the results were far superior when the adversary was allowed to plan around 
existing security countermeasures, which is a more likely representation of the real 
world.76 
The U.S. Coast Guard’s (USCG) Port Resilience Operational/Tactical 
Enforcement to Combat Terrorism (PROTECT) is another example of a Bayesian game 
theory deployment initiative.77 One of the more unique aspects of the PROTECT 
initiative is that it has undergone a real-world evaluation using adversary perspective 
teams, comprised of trained security professionals equipped with the understanding of 
“the adversary’s known intent, capabilities, skills, commitment, resources, and cultural 
influences,” in an effort to gain relevant feedback in lieu of interaction with an actual 






77 Eric Shieh et al., “PROTECT: A Deployed Game Theoretic System to Protect the Ports of the 
United States,” in Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent 
Systems—Volume 1, AAMAS ’12 (Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and 
Multiagent Systems, 2012), 13–20, http://teamcore.usc.edu/people/eshieh/AAMAS2012-protect.pdf.  
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adversary.78 The results of these evaluations demonstrated “a positive trend where the 
effectiveness of deterrence increased from the pre- to post- PROTECT observations.”79 
C. INHERENT CHALLENGES 
Several challenges are associated with risk-based deployment methodologies that 
must be at a minimum understood, and ideally overcome, by any organization that seeks 
their use.  
1. Defining Risk 
The first challenge is simply defining risk. As Chris Reifel, a CHDS master’s 
program alum, noted in his thesis, “[e]xisting approaches to risk management hinge upon 
the how risk is defined.”80 While Reifel’s thesis goes on to explore the etymology of the 
term and provides numerous competing definitions and understandings, the U.S. DHS 
Risk Steering Committee has established a definition for its purposes that can 
subsequently be leveraged by TSA. As defined by the U.S. DHS Risk Steering 
Committee, risk is the “potential for an adverse outcome assessed as a function of threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with an incident, event, or occurrence.”81  
2. Establishing Inputs 
With a working definition of risk established, several additional challenges begin 
to emerge. The first is identifying the inputs for threat, vulnerability, and consequence. 
Holistically, the RAND Corporation touches upon this in its report titled Predictive 
Policing: The Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations, where it was 
noted that “relying on poor-quality data” is a pitfall when pursuing predictive policing.82 
According to the RAND Corporation, there are “three typical deficiencies that can affect 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Christopher S. Reifel, “Quantitative Risk Analysis for Homeland Security Resource Allocation” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=469650. 
81 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Risk Steering Committee, DHS Risk Lexicon (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-risk-lexicon-
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data quality: data censoring, systematic bias, and relevance.”83 This pitfall is probably 
best summarized by the adage garbage-in, garbage-out, and can be overcome by either 
ensuring that quality data is utilized or understanding the limitations of the data provided, 
and subsequent limitations of the outputs. In an article appearing in the journal Risk 
Analysis, authors Dillon, Liebe, and Bestafka further expand upon this challenge by 
noting while “most researchers agree that the risk of terrorism is some function of threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences, many competing theories exist on how to consider these 
components.”84  
3. Useful Products 
Once the aforementioned challenges are overcome, or at a minimum understood, 
the focus shifts towards turning the output of a risk-based deployment methodology into 
something of value to tactical-level operators. The RAND Corporation touches upon this 
concept when it discusses the pitfall of “focusing on prediction accuracy instead of 
tactical utility.”85 Erik Dahl in his book, Intelligence and Surprise Attack, further 
corroborates the importance of this concept. As Dahl notes, “precise, tactical-level 
intelligence warning together with policymakers who are receptive to that warning” is the 
difference between intelligence successes and intelligence failures.86 The sheer 
spontaneity that is the human experience will likely keep 100% accuracy an idealized 
target and, as RAND notes, “we must accept some limits on ‘accuracy.’”87 However, it is 
likely much easier said than done. As Henry H. Willis notes in the journal, Risk Analysis, 
“Establishing tolerable levels of risk is one of the most contentious and important risk 
management decisions.”88  
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4. Measuring Effectiveness 
Another challenge is how to measure the amount of risk that was mitigated 
through the deployment of resources. The RAND Corporation outlines 
“underemphasizing assessment and evaluation” as a pitfall to avoid and points out that 
“very few [practitioners] said that they had evaluated the effectiveness of the predictions 
they produced or the interventions developed in response to their predictions.”89 In all 
likelihood, it is due to the reality that measuring risk mitigation is very difficult. Although 
speaking about challenges with homeland security grant funding, Willis’s assessment that 
“currently, neither the methods nor the data are available to answer questions about the 
effectiveness of available risk reduction alternatives” is applicable to the field at large.90 
The researchers who developed risk terrain modeling, however, suggest that results can 
be achieved “by regularly re-assessing risk, and then measuring changes in risk values 
among different risk terrain maps at micro or macro levels using basic inferential 
statistics.”91  
5. Protecting Civil Rights and Liberties 
It is also important to note that a risk-based deployment methodology will, by 
definition, drive resources to areas deemed to present greater risk. As the RAND 
Corporation notes, “the very act of labeling areas and people as worthy of further law 
enforcement attention inherently raises concerns about civil liberties and privacy 
rights,”92 and “overlooking civil and privacy rights” is a pitfall that must be avoided. 
While the overwhelming majority of TSA employees are not law enforcement officers, 
this concern is no less valid and is in fact of particular importance to the TSA, which 
interacts with approximately two million aviation passengers every day.93 Furthermore, 
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TSA does have much in common with law enforcement when considering its 
responsibility to screen both individuals and items along with its ability to prevent the 
introduction of either into the transportation system when they present a security threat.  
As a risk-based deployment methodology becomes more granular, the importance 
of protecting individual civil rights and liberties becomes increasingly more significant. 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the standards for what “constitutes reasonable 
suspicion are relaxed” in areas deemed high-crime, or “hot-spots,” which affords some 
leeway for operators.94 However, in a 2012 presentation to the Law Enforcement 
Information Management Conference, researchers noted that this “issue [is] minor in 
comparison to civil and privacy rights issues raised by identifying “hot people.”95  
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IV. POLICY EVALUATION 
With an understanding of several potential ways to address the challenge of 
optimizing resource deployment and a cursory framework upon which to form an 
objective recommendation, three options are presented and assessed. 
A rating of 1 reflects a positive correlation while a rating of 3 reflects a negative 
correlation for a given criterion. Using this scale facilitates a simple initial postulation 
while avoiding the challenges that a more granular scale introduces (e.g., is it a 4 or a 5?)  
A. OPTION A—MAINTAIN CURRENT RESOURCE DEPLOYMENT 
STRATEGY 
If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.  
~ Bert Lance 
In a scientific experiment, Option A would be considered the control group, as it 
makes it possible to measure the effects of a given treatment against an established 
baseline. In the absence of an experiment, analyzing Option A allows the current 
approach to be assessed.  
At present, TSA as an enterprise lacks a standardized tactical-level risk-based 
deployment methodology for its assets and tends to instead rely upon a combination of 
individual subject matter expertise and the occasional program-specific approach. For 
example, a 2014 DHS OIG report found, “TSA created documents and schedules with 
short term goals based on institutional knowledge to deploy AIT” and “did not have a 
policy or process requiring program offices to document strategic deployment plans for 
new technology that align with the goals of the Passenger Screening Program.”96  
In its response, TSA noted that it has “launched the effort to develop and approve 
updated deployment strategies that address short- and long-term goals,” however, it 
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appears as though these are still in development and this research provides TSA an 
opportunity to further its endeavor.97  
1. Security Effectiveness 
Determining the precise level of security effectiveness of TSA’s current resource 
deployment strategy would require considerable resources to include active participation 
by the agency and is not necessary for the objectives of this evaluation. However, it 
would be reasonable to assume that an opportunity may exist to improve after a recent 
classified DHS OIG report released in May 2015 showed how often “red team” security 
auditors were able to circumvent security screening.98 While unendorsed results are 
available in the public domain, the official results remain classified and are not included 
in this research. That said, Secretary Johnson has noted, “The numbers in these reports 
never look good out of context” before laying out a six-point improvement plan that lends 
itself to some semblance of poor performance.99  
Despite these challenges, the fact remains that TSA has prevented hundreds of 
thousands of prohibited items, including firearms and explosives, from being carried onto 
planes over the past several years, as demonstrated in Table 1. While it is impossible to 
calculate an exact rate of detection using these numbers alone, as the precise number of 
items that were introduced and could have been potentially detected by officers must be 
known, the interdiction of these items does point to a level of efficacy.100  
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Table 1.   Known Prohibited Item Encounter Rate 
 FY12101 FY13102 FY14103 
# of Items Screened 2,425,000,000 2,425,000,000 2,040,000,000 
# of Prohibited Items Discovered 117,000 111,000 111,000 
Known Encounter Rate (%) 0.0048% 0.0046% 0.0054% 
 
As such, a rating of 2 is given for this particular criterion. 
2. System Efficiency 
With regard to current system efficiency, a combination of TSA’s staffing 
numbers and publicly available screening results can be used to develop a cursory 
understanding of how the system is operating, as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Passengers and Baggage Screened per FTE 
 FY12104 FY13105 FY14106 
# of Employees 51,767 51,378 49,427 
# of Passengers Screened 640,000,000 640,000,000 660,000,000 
# of Items Screened 2,425,000,000 2,425,000,000 2,040,000,000 
Average Passengers per FTE 12,363 12,457 13,353 
Average Bags per FTE 46,845 47,199 41,273 
 
For example, TSA received 49,427 full-time equivalent (FTE) in FY14 for 
aviation security purposes while screening approximately 660 million passengers during 
the same timeframe.107 At that rate, each FTE screened an average of approximately 
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13,353 passengers and 41,237 bags for the year, or nearly 257 passengers and 792 bags 
each week.  
While these figures might seem rather low, it is important to note that outliers also 
certainly exist in a network as large as the approximately 440 federalized airports that 
TSA operates at across the nation, such as Hartsfield–Jackson Atlanta International with 
nearly 47 million enplanements in 2014 versus approximately 5,700 at Cheyenne 
Regional/Jerry Olson Field.108  
As such, a rating of 2 is given for this particular criterion.  
3. Constitutional Considerations 
From a purely functional perspective, TSA’s current resource deployment strategy 
does not violate citizen’s rights under the Fourth or Fifth Amendments of the U.S. 
Constitution. However, all resources require proper jurisdiction to operate in a given 
location once they have been deployed and their activities are certainly subject to legal 
scrutiny. The scope and nature of these activities is not relevant for the purposes of this 
research in that they have no bearing on the actual deployment of resources and a rating 
of 1 is given for this particular criterion.  
4. Social Considerations 
When considering some of the social issues surrounding TSA’s current 
deployment approach, understanding the role and impact of its flagship program, TSA 
PreCheck, is helpful. Passengers enrolled in TSA PreCheck undergo additional preflight 
screening, to include a background check, and are subsequently, deemed “low-risk” and 
eligible to use dedicated lines and receive expedited screening at select airports 
throughout the United States.109 In return, TSA is better able to focus its resources on 
individuals deemed high-risk (e.g., selectees) or who present an unknown risk.  
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By maintaining this strategy, it can be presumed that TSA will continue to 
decrease overall travel time as more individuals are enrolled into the TSA PreCheck 
program and become eligible for expedited screening. While TSA PreCheck enrollments 
reached 1 million passengers in its first 15 months of operation, which lends itself 
towards some level of sustainability, it is also important to note that the success of this 
strategy is dependent on both passenger participation in the program and TSA’s ability to 
provide dedicated resources to serve this growing population.110  
Despite the “strong majority” of individuals in a recent poll (79%) reporting that 
they believe separating pre-screened passengers into a different line will speed up the 
screening process, the method of doing so is divisive with nearly one-third (29%) felt that 
the requirements for TSA PreCheck violated applicants’ privacy.111 When those polled 
were asked to specify the level of scrutiny they felt would be appropriate for inclusion 
into the program, the results varied considerably, as demonstrated in Table 3. 
Table 3.   Public Opinion of TSA PreCheck Vetting Measures 
 Percent Agreeing112 
Passing a criminal background check 76% 
Submitting to a fingerprint scan 73% 
Holding U.S. citizenship 70% 
An analysis of past travel habits 56% 
Passing a drug test 37% 




Perhaps most interestingly, over half (56%) felt that treating passengers 
differently in the first place was unfair.113 
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As such, a rating of 2 is given for this particular criterion. 
5. Political Feasibility 
Lastly, when considering political feasibility of TSA’s current deployment 
approach, it is certainly focused on its established mission of protecting the nation’s 
transportation systems, which includes pivoting to meet emerging challenges, as 
evidenced by its focus on mitigating the insider threat following a high-profile incident in 
December 2014.114 In the aftermath of this particular incident, in which aviation 
employees allegedly leveraged their privileged access to smuggle firearms onto aircraft, 
TSA responded to by redeploying many of its officers to conduct unpredictable employee 
screenings.115  
TSA also continues to realize savings as a result of its risk-based security posture, 
with the agency requesting $119 million less in FY16 when compared to its previous 
year’s request, citing several “risk-based security efficiencies.”116 These reductions 
included a 1,666 FTE reduction in the screening workforce, with TSA noting “RBS 
methods have proven more efficient in moving people through the checkpoint than 
regular screening lanes and require fewer resources.”117  
As such, a rating of 1 is given for this particular criterion.  
B. OPTION B—ADAPT AN EXISTING DATA-DRIVEN RISK-BASED 
DEPLOYMENT METHODOLOGY 
If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.  
~ Sir Isaac Newton 
In the world of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), this approach might be 
characterized as leveraging commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions to 
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tackle the identified problem of increasing the efficient and effective deployment of 
resources.118 Several products already exist and are currently used in the law 
enforcement domain including DDACTS, RTM, and PredPol. 
Option B entails exploring the use of these, or similar, products in the aviation 
security domain. While this solution ideally decreases the adoption curve, as it builds 
upon existing methodologies that have demonstrated success, it also exposes risks 
including the potential for gaps between the needs of the agency and the capabilities of 
the solution, as they were not expressly created for TSA’s use.  
1. Security Effectiveness 
To hypothesize the potential impact properly that adapting an existing risk-based 
deployment methodology will have on TSA’s security effectiveness, attention must be 
given to the past performance of such solutions by other entities.  
As demonstrated and discussed in Chapter III, the performance of DDACTS, 
RTM, and PredPol has been measuredly positive with methodology-driven officer 
deployments with significant decreases in the illicit activity they seek to reduce. The 
importance of these decreases is particularly relevant in departments that, much like TSA 
at present, relied heavily upon human judgment and analysis to deploy officers tactically 
prior to the use of a data-driven methodology.  
For example, consider the case of the Kent Police Department in which the 
accuracy of its crime forecasting more than doubled from 5% to 11% through the use of 
PredPol.119 While it is true that it is a far cry from 100% accuracy, it is nonetheless a step 
in the right direction and validates the ability for such methodologies to overcome 
countless years of relying upon a mix of intuition and manual analysis. Similarly, the use 
of such methodologies is a relatively new phenomenon and it is likely that improvements 
will be seen in accuracy, as departments continue to adopt them, as it will provide both 
the funding and tangible feedback critical for ongoing research and development. 
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Despite the generally positive results, it is important to note that none of the 
existing methodologies found in the literature, including the three methodologies 
discussed in detail (DDACTS, RTM, and PredPol), were specifically designed with the 
deployment of aviation security assets in mind. As such, a risk of decreased security 
effectiveness is possible should they be deployed, and more importantly, fully relied upon 
while they undergo any needed recalibration for this unique environment.  
That said, it is also certainly within the realm of possibility to repurpose these 
methodologies and tools, as evidenced by several studies undertaken by the creators of 
RTM. One such example is a 2010 study conducted by researchers Dr. William Moreto 
and Dr. Joel Caplan to determine whether risk terrain modeling could be adapted to 
forecast maritime piracy throughout the world.120 The research team began this study by 
identifying a number of different data points ranging from the number of maritime 
chokepoints to country assessments from the failed states index.121 Once all the data 
points had been identified, corresponding data from 2008 was loaded into the model and 
the results were compared against known incidents from 2009, with RTM successfully 
identifying the location of pirate attacks more than 60% of the time.122  
While the study was hypothetical in the sense that an actual deployment of 
countermeasures to mitigate the assessed risk never occurred, the study successfully 
demonstrated that RTM can be used to produce tactical-level information for non-
traditional purposes.  
While a more thorough discussion exists in Chapter III, it would be fair to 
characterize the results as generally positive. As such, a rating of 1 is given for this 
particular criterion. 
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2. System Efficiency 
When considering system efficiency, an article appearing in the journal Risk 
Analysis by Henry H. Willis surmises “ultimately, efficient allocation of homeland 
security resources would distribute resources where they can most reduce risks, not 
where risks are the greatest.”123 In this area, data-driven tools and methodologies can 
lead to increased performance, such as Kansas City’s use of RTM to guide the 
deployment of narcotics officers successfully in Chapter III. 
Furthermore, many of these systems have demonstrated an ability to outperform 
the work of existing criminal analysts using other methods to optimize officer 
deployments.124 As such, further efficiencies can be gained by redeploying these criminal 
analysts to other tasks and allowing deployments to be driven by tools like DDACTS, 
RTM, and PredPol and a rating of 1 is given for this particular criterion. 
3. Constitutional Considerations 
From a legal perspective, two primary questions appear to surround the use of a 
data-driven risk-based deployment methodology. The first question is what, if any, 
impact that such a methodology has on established thresholds for law enforcement 
engagement, and more specifically, search and seizure. The second question is what data 
elements can, and cannot, be used to formulate an understanding of the risk environment.  
In the United States, the government must first establish a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity to search a citizen and probable cause to detain them.125 The use of a 
risk-based deployment methodology raises several important questions regarding these 
precedents and its ability to play into the calculus of whether the thresholds have been 
met. Most notably, does an individual’s mere presence in a specific area that has been 
deemed high-risk by a given methodology in and of itself constitute reasonable suspicion, 
or even become a factor that effectively lowers the established threshold? 
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For example, two women in Santa Cruz, CA were confronted, and subsequently, 
arrested (on unrelated charges) after they were found peering into car windows in an area 
identified by a predictive model as at-risk for car thefts.126 As the author of a more 
comprehensive discussion on the topic noted, “it is arguable that peering into windows in 
a parking garage is sufficient reason to be stopped and detained by police.”127 However, 
when this behavior was coupled with the results of predictive modeling, the Santa Cruz 
Police Department decided to move in.  
A second point that must be established is the right for entities in the United State 
to collect the data that drives risk-based deployment methodologies. The United States 
operates under the framework of the U.S. Constitution and interpretations by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which has held that certain limitations are placed on the government’s 
ability to infringe upon the privacy of citizens despite the word “privacy” never actually 
appearing in the U.S. Constitution.128 When it comes to data privacy, what those 
limitations are has yet to be clearly defined through litigation, which has left some calling 
for the passage of a national statute or constitutional amendment to address the issue.129 
Several states have also begun adopting their own legislation regarding the right to data 
privacy in the absence of a more broad decree.130  
Despite this ongoing debate, it would appear as though the concerns raised can be 
abated through the use of rather broad, publicly available data, such as criminal activity 
in specific areas, as PredPol has done. Conversely, care must be taken when more 
sensitive data like personally identifiable information (PII) is used to identify risk hot-
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spots. It is important that TSA work with experts not only well versed in data privacy 
laws, but also in its own unique operations (e.g., aviation security) to ensure that the use 
of given data elements usage will withstand legal scrutiny should it decide to pursue a 
data driven risk-based deployment methodology. 
In light of these concerns, a rating of 2 is given for this particular criterion.  
4. Social Considerations 
Considering the amount of data that individuals willingly provide to private 
companies each and every day, and working off the understanding that the majority of 
individuals present little or no risk to aviation security, the holistic notion of using of data 
to decrease travel time and screening scrutiny would seemingly be a good thing. 
However, a great deal of public concurrence hinges on the actual data used seeing as how 
nearly one-third (29%) of respondents to a 2014 survey on TSA’s practices felt that the 
current data requirements (e.g., criminal history) for TSA PreCheck violated applicants’ 
privacy.131  
Similar concerns have been raised regarding the use of big data methodologies by 
law enforcement agencies. For example, Kent Police Department’s launch of PredPol 
quickly drew comparisons to the science fiction film Minority Report from British media, 
just as it had in previous U.S. deployments.132 In the film, set in the 2050s, a specialized 
PreCrime department is responsible for arresting murderers before they are able to 
actually carry out their attacks by using a combination of psychic ability and technology. 
While a common thread certainly exists in that police are attempting to be proactive 
rather than reactive in both cases, the notion that a methodology like PredPol could lead 
to a preventive arrest and/or conviction seems farfetched but certainly highlights both the 
fascination and fear that citizens have of living in such a world. 
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More pronounced concerns are seen when elements of PII are incorporated into 
the big data analyzed by law enforcement agencies. In a 2014 pilot study launched by the 
London Metropolitan Police to “identify groups of gang members that were at the highest 
risk of reoffending” using big data, a prominent privacy group was quick to caution 
police “to be very careful about how they use this kind of technology.”133 The Chicago 
Police Department has faced similar criticism of its proactive outreach program that uses 
computer algorithms to identify specific individuals at risk of becoming victims of 
violent crime by combining criminal activity data with social network theory.134 
In light of these concerns, a rating of 2 is given for this particular criterion.  
5. Political Feasibility 
When exploring the political feasibility of adapting an existing risk-based 
deployment methodology to execute its mission, maintaining or increasing effective and 
efficient operations is critical. It includes creating a compelling need for decision makers 
to determine that the investment in data driven risk-based deployment methodologies is a 
sound one. The cost of the software alone is oftentimes hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
For example, the annual cost of the PredPol software used by the Kent Police was 
£130,000, or nearly $200,000.135  
This price tag only increases when the cost of the hardware to run the software, 
specialized training, and similar costs are included. In an austere budget environment, 
such costs would most certainly be questioned. However, as a police analyst and part-
time blogger noted in a discussion on the topic, “it’s cheaper to prevent a crime than to 
solve a crime, and that’s where I think the promise lies.”  
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Seeing as how a data-driven risk-based deployment methodology has the potential 
to help TSA execute its mission and increase efficiency, a rating of 1 is given for this 
criterion.  
C. OPTION C—INVEST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BAYESIAN GAME 
THEORY RISK-BASED DEPLOYMENT METHODOLOGY 
When my information changes, I alter my conclusions. What do you do, 
sir?  
~ John Maynard Keynes 
Through careful planning, Option C can best be characterized as a calculated 
investment in the emerging field of predictive analysis. At present, only a handful of 
tactical-level risk-based deployment methodologies exist within TSA. While each of 
these methodologies strives to meet the unique needs of the individual stakeholders and 
agency program offices that sponsored their development, they lack congruence, and 
subsequently, deprive leaders at the strategic level of the organization potentially 
valuable information regarding risk across the environment while simultaneously 
depriving individuals at all levels of valuable time due to their oft-duplicative nature.  
One of the benefits of Option C is that it would be a truly customized solution, 
which means that TSA could capitalize upon existing capital knowledge acquired as 
individual program offices developed their own tools and solutions by ensuring their 
participation in the early design stages. This participation will also help ensure that any 
solution meets the needs of these stakeholders in addition to those of the agency at-large.  
As previously noted, several existing platforms are available; however, those 
based in Bayesian game theory, such as IRIS and GUARDS, hold a great deal of promise 
due to their inherent ability to (1) account for the actions of a defender, and (2) forecast 
the adversarial reaction.  
1. Security Effectiveness 
Similar to Option B, an assessment of the past performance of existing Bayesian 
game theory risk-based deployment methodologies must be conducted to hypothesize 
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properly the impact on TSA’s security effectiveness. That said, an additional level of 
fidelity relative to the assessment of Option B exists in that the two primary examples, 
IRIS and GUARDS, were designed with aviation security in mind and evaluated 
accordingly. Furthermore, as demonstrated in Chapter III, both the quantitative and 
anecdotal results of several evaluations of these approaches have been largely positive. 
However, game theory is certainly not without its critics, many of whom argue 
that its major flaw is its reliance on a rational actor with a given set of preferences to 
model possible outcomes.136 Commonly cited examples of irrational acts that defy game 
theory include altruistic deeds, in which individual actors sacrifice more than they receive 
in return, and individuals who refuse to follow social norms of behavior that allow for 
rational modeling. While a great deal of debate is occurring within academia on whether 
game theory can explain such seemingly “irrational” behavior, the likelihood of 
encountering a truly irrational actor in the first place must also must be considered, and 
weigh that against the utility of modeling against a rational one.  
In returning to the private industry, it is unlikely that a successful company like 
Starbucks would open a retail outlet in the middle of cornfield vice opening an outlet on 
Main Street of a nearby town unless it is highly probable that it would generate a greater 
return on investment. Yes, the  possibility always exists that some individuals may seek 
out a Starbucks in the middle of a cornfield; however, the company’s stockholders (i.e., 
U.S. taxpayers) are unlikely to see the merit of such a seemingly irrational move. 
Similarly, it is certainly possible to encounter an actor that cannot be modeled and is 
subsequently able to overcome the security of an entity that leverages a resource 
deployment system based in game theory, but a far more likely outcome is encountering 
and disrupting a rational actor. 
It is also important to note that researchers have successfully demonstrated the 
ability for game theory models to overcome aspects of this rational actor limitation. In 
one such experiment, researchers with the USCG’s PROTECT initiative were able to 
                                                 
136 Gale Lucas, Matthew D. McCubbins, and Mark Turner, “Against Game Theory,” in Emerging 
Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource, 
ed. Robert A. Scott and Stephen M. Kosslyn (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015). 
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develop a “quantal response” model that mimics irrationality by “presume[ing] that 
humans will choose better actions at a higher frequency, but with noise added to the 
decision-making process.”137 The results were positive, with the researchers finding that 
this new model “more robustly handles real-world uncertainties than a perfect rationality 
model.”138 Furthermore, simply maintaining some aspect of randomness in an otherwise 
optimized resource deployment strategy can help mitigate this risk.  
As such, a rating of 1 is given for this particular criterion. 
2. System Efficiency 
While Option C affords TSA an opportunity to tailor an approach to meet its 
unique needs, it also lacks the convenience of simply maintaining the status quo or 
pursuing a more readily available data-driven solution. In turn, it results in the 
government potentially expending additional resources when compared to Option A and 
Option B. However, the existence of two models that could be leveraged does have a 
mitigating effect. Furthermore, it could also be considered an investment likely to yield a 
positive return in the long-term as resource deployment would be further optimized to 
TSA’s needs.  
When examining the USCG’s experience with PROTECT, it was noted by 
industry port partners that “the Coast Guard seems to be everywhere, all the time,” while 
the number of documented reports of illicit activity increased when compared to prior 
operations.139 The relevance of these increases is that “no actual increase in the number 
of resources applied, and therefore no increase in capital or operating costs,” occurred, 
which lends credibility that such an approach can increase efficiency from an adversarial 
perspective.140  
As a result, a rating of 1 is given for the efficiency criterion. 
                                                 






3. Constitutional Considerations  
When considering the legal issues surrounding this option, the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments are unwavering, while the path that TSA determines to travel when 
designing a risk-based resource deployment strategy is far more flexible. Much like 
Option A, and to a lesser extent Option B, the impact of these protections is more likely 
to come into play as a deployment methodology is operationalized, which can be 
addressed through proper training and oversight.  
As a result, a rating of 1 is given for this criterion. 
4. Social Considerations 
Similarly, TSA has the ability to take public interests into account when crafting a 
risk-based resource deployment methodology and address potential areas of concern 
proactively. It includes determining whether to utilize passenger information and to what 
extent should the decision be made to do so. 
When this flexibility is coupled with the potential that the average low-risk 
passengers, which is understood to be a majority of the traveling public, could more 
easily traverse the transportation system as security resources will be more focused on 
high-risk areas and passengers, a rating of 1 is given for this criterion.  
5. Political Feasibility 
Lastly, when considering the political feasibility of this option, a customized 
solution to increase the effective and efficient deployment of its resources can certainly 
be considered in-line with the mission of TSA. It can also be presumed that an optimized 
solution will ultimately result in fewer resources being needed to execute TSAs mission, 
which should aid in its political salience.  
As such, a rating of 1 is given to this criterion.  
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V. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
The following sections provide an overview of the findings of the policy options 
analysis, and several recommendations to consider for implementation.  
A. FINDINGS 
The challenge of optimizing decisions, such as the deployment of limited 
resources in the case of TSA, is something that humans have long struggled with and the 
gravity of TSA’s counterterrorism mission only magnifies the difficulties that lie therein. 
While certainly not an exhaustive collection of possible solutions to this 
challenge, three distinct options were presented and analyzed using a policy options 
analysis framework in an effort to begin answering the question: 
• How can the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) use a risk-
based deployment methodology to deploy its resources in an effort to 
increase security effectiveness and system efficiency? 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4. 












Option A 2 2 1 2 1 8 
Option B 1 1 2 2 1 7 
Option C 1 1 1 1 1 5 
 
It is important to note that Option C is certainly not a panacea to the challenge; 
however, it is a viable risk-based solution with an ancillary benefit of being one that TSA 
has already begun exploring.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Several strategic recommendations were identified while researching the use 
of risk-based deployment methodologies by other entities, and are shared with the hopes 
of promoting a positive outcome.  
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1. Work with Stakeholders (Particularly the General Public) 
As previously noted, the use of risk-based resource deployment methodologies 
within the security domain tends immediately to conjure comparisons to fictional works, 
such as George Orwell’s novel 1984 and the 2002 film amongst the general public.  
While these comparisons represent, in part, a legitimate fear of tyrannical 
government and loss of due process, they also represent an opportunity for police 
departments and other users to engage with the public and dispel such exaggerated 
portrayals. The first step is simply making the use of such tools as transparent as possible, 
much like the Kent Police did through an aggressive media campaign and willingness to 
share information about their own experiences. Such transparency affords a tangential 
benefit in that messaging can help manage expectations within both the agency and 
community, as many of the fictional works individuals are familiar with portray 
tremendous accuracy, whereas the results of current tools are less profound. 
2. Mitigate Personnel Concerns and Prevent Overreliance 
Similarly, departments must work with their employees to help alleviate concerns 
that risk-based deployment methodologies are simply a replacement for their own 
expertise and experience. In a recent interview, a captain with the Los Angeles Police 
Department compared their own use of PredPol to using a fish finder.141 Just as an 
experienced fisherman would know where to drop their line, the captain noted, “a really 
good officer would be able to go out and find these boxes. This kind of makes the 
average guys’ ability to find the crime a little bit better.”142  
The beauty of this analogy is that not only can many relate to it or that it strokes 
the ego of the “fisher,” but that it subtly reinforces the reality that someone with good 
judgment will always be needed to hold the reel. This approach also highlights the 
importance of critical thinking, imagination, and judgment. These are key factors to 
                                                 
141 Berg, “Predicting Crime, LAPD-Style.” 
142 Ibid. 
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successful decision making, which is critical given the inability for current technology to 
generate forecasts with 100% accuracy.  
The researchers and developers of such models themselves have also noted the 
importance of the relationship between computer models and their operators. In one such 
study regarding mixed-initiative approaches, “in which human users and software 
assistants (agents) collaborate to make security decisions,” several individuals associated 
with the development of GUARDS and IRIS postulated that overall performance can be 
increased through such interactions.143 
3. Maintain Unpredictable Security 
Any formula-driven methodology in which a defined set of variables are 
measured and analyzed is susceptible to reverse engineering and TSA must continue to 
promote unpredictable security programs as a mitigation strategy against this 
vulnerability.  
Furthermore, as noted in the discussion of Bayesian game theory in Chapter III, it 
is improbable that TSA will ever have the benefit of knowing all possible attack scenarios 
against which it must defend. As noted in the work Fooled by Randomness, “Probability 
is not a mere computation of odds on the dice or more complicated variants; it is the 
acceptance of the lack of certainty in our knowledge and the development of methods for 
dealing with our ignorance.”144 While minimizing the consequence of a successful attack 
(provided it cannot be stopped in the first place) is an ideal risk mitigation strategy in 
light of this uncertainty, maintaining some semblance of what is understood as 
unpredictability is another. 
A primary example of such a program is Playbook, which is currently “part of the 
various security layers operating at our Nation’s airports, serv[ing] to mitigate both 
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passenger and insider threats using a range of proven tactics, techniques and procedures 
[by adding] unpredictability and flexibility to security initiatives.”145 A particular benefit 
of this program is that it provides TSA with an existing mitigation strategy that requires 
no change to current operations. 
4. Focus on Effectiveness, Then Efficiency 
Throughout this paper, effectiveness has been noted before efficiency with the 
intention of ensuring that the focus remains on the successful execution of TSA’s mission 
of protecting the nation’s transportation systems. Only once a suitable level of 
effectiveness has been established, with an understanding that some level of risk is likely 
assumed in a risk-based model, should TSA shift its focus towards identifying how to 
optimize the process.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful.  
~ George E. P. Box 
While Bayesian game theory risk-based deployment methodologies like IRIS and 
GUARDS show promise, they are far from the tools used in science-fiction works like 
Minority Report. It is important for everyone from the department that decides to pursue 
this capability to the community at-large to understand the potential benefits, and 
limitations, of the systems currently available and the challenges they present. It is also 
important to keep the oft-cited fears from works of science-fiction like Minority Report 
part of the conversation as a cautionary tale of what can go wrong (or right) in a world 
without due process.  
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